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Performing Injustice: 
Human Rights and Verbatim Theatre
Harry Derbyshire and Loveday Hodson*
I. INTRODUCTION
This interdisciplinary collaboration, located at the intersection between law and theatre,
is a response to three recent theatrical interventions in the area of human rights which
raise questions for scholars in each discipline. Although human rights are largely
presented as a legal phenomenon, their articulation in dramatic form is one indication
that rights transcend the formal legalistic framework within which they are commonly
placed. The theatrical treatment of human rights allows for the dissemination of
information, the arousal of compassion, and the raising of consciousness in a way that is
particular to that form. In this article we consider three British productions: Guantánamo:
‘Honor Bound to Defend Freedom’ (2004); My Name is Rachel Corrie (2005), which
dramatises occupation and protest in Palestine; and Called to Account (2007), which raises
questions concerning the legality of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. All three plays deploy
verbatim testimony in order to draw a particular kind of attention to human rights issues.
We begin with a discussion of recent legal scholarship that points to the limitations
of human rights laws and their lack of connection to the human suffering they are
intended to mitigate; we suggest, however, that such scholarship unnecessarily
characterises human rights in formal legal terms that can never convey their full meaning.
Ascribing meaning to human rights, we contend, is a cultural process that is not confined
to corridors of power and courtrooms. We then move to a discussion of the three plays,
establishing their theatrical context and the means by which they seek to intervene in the
situations that they dramatise. We also consider the status of human rights laws as
represented in these plays. Our final section explores the question of how far theatre can
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have a practical impact as a socio-political force and, therefore, what it can do for human
rights. 
II. THE ROLE OF LAW IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE
While the genesis of human rights ideology remains a matter of debate, it is widely
recognised that human rights has been a significant force in national and international
discourse since the end of World War II.1 The 1945 Charter of the United Nations and,
subsequently, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were part of a reordering of
international relations that has legitimised international concern with human rights
violations.2 Regionally, the Council of Europe,3 the African Union4 and the Organization
of American States5 have all made the protection and promotion of human rights a
central part of their purpose. Forsythe is far from alone when he describes the extent to
which human rights discourse has come to impact upon the theory and practice of inter-
state relations as ‘truly revolutionary’.6 In turn, human rights discourse has penetrated
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1 For commentary on this point see, for example: R Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights, (2 edn
Oxford University Press, 2005) 24; J Rehman, International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach
(Longman, Harlow 2002) 1; AH Robertson and JG Merrills, Human Rights in the World (4th edn Manchester
University Press, Manchester 1996) 1; J Donnelly, International Human Rights (Westview Press, Boulder
1998) 4. For a survey of the pre-WWII human rights system, see HJ Steiner, P Alston and R Goodman,
International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (3rd edn Oxford University Press, 2007) ch 2.
2 Article 1(3) of the Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October
1945) UKTS 1946 No 67, names ‘promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all …’ as one of the essential purposes of the organisation. See also Articles 55 and 56.
3 Article 1 of the 1949 Statute of the Council of Europe (adopted 5 May 1949, entered into force 3 August
1949) 87 UNTS 103, reads:
(a) The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of
safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic
and social progress. 
(b) This aim shall be pursued through the organs of the Council by discussion of questions of common concern
and by agreements and common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters
and in the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
4 Article 3 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (adopted 11 July 2000, entered into force 26 May
2001) OAU Doc CAB/LEG/23.15, provides: ‘The objectives of the Union shall be to … (h) promote and
protect human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
and other relevant human rights instruments …’
5 Article 3(l) of the 1948 Charter of the Organization of American States (adopted 30 April 1948, entered
into force 13 December 1951: several subsequent amendments) 119 UNTS 3, provides that: ‘The American
States proclaim the fundamental rights of the individual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed,
or sex.’ Chapter XV of that treaty provides for an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (a body
that was initially established by Resolution VII of the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, Santiago, 12–18 August 1959).
6 DP Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 4.
national systems, with most modern constitutions declaring respect for human rights,7
and national and trans-national actors commonly seizing upon human rights arguments
in support of their political claims.8 In fact, ‘rights talk’ has become widespread in modern
times. Henry J Steiner and Philip Alston echo the sentiments of many when they observe
that the human rights ideal ‘has become a part of modern consciousness, a lens through
which to see the world, a universal discourse, a potent rhetoric and aspiration’.9
If human rights ideology has penetrated cultural and political mainstreams, law has
been both the most prominent means by which human rights have been pursued and the
primary discourse through which human rights have been discussed. In the rush of
enthusiasm for human rights that followed World War II, the declaration of a variety of
formal laws designed to protect human rights was seized upon as a means of giving
concrete expression to an otherwise abstract ideology. A plethora of international and
regional laws giving voice to general and specific human rights concerns have been
created,10 which have been mirrored in numerous regional human rights instruments.11
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7 Some well-known examples are the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (which forms the first part
of the Constitution Act 1982), the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996, and the Republic
of Iraq Constitution of 2005. Steiner and Alston have noted that ‘Since the end of the Cold War new
constitutions, including bills of rights, have been adopted in a great many countries. In Central and Eastern
Europe alone, there have been more than 25 new or revised constitutions in that time. Developments in
Africa have been characterized as a prolonged fit of “constitutional fever”; a 1998 compilation included 20
constitutions published in French since 1990.’ (HJ Steiner and P Alston, International Human Rights in
Context: Law, Politics, Morals (2nd edn Oxford University Press, 2000) 990). 
8 See, for example: ME Keck and K Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International
Politics (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1998); P Willetts (ed), “The Conscience of the World”:
The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System (Hurst & Co, London 1996).
9 Steiner and Alston (n 7) v.
10 Internationally, the major human rights treaties are: the 1996 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171; the 1996
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into
force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3; the 1966 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (adopted 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195; the 1979
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 December
1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 513; the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26
June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85; the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20
November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3; the 1990 International Convention on
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (adopted 18 December
1990, entered into force 1 July 2003) 2220 UNTS 93; the 2006 International Convention for the Protection
of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances (adopted 20 December 2006, not yet entered into force) GA
Res A/61/177 (2006), reprinted in (2007) 14 International Human Rights Reports 582; and the 2006
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, entered into force 3
May 2008) GA Res A/61/611, (2006) 46 International Legal Materials 443. 
11 Regionally, one might refer, amongst others, to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213
UNTS 222; the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 21 November 1969, entered into
force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 123; and the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted
27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217.
Several of those instruments establish relatively sophisticated monitoring mechanisms
to secure compliance with their terms. As already noted, human rights also make an
appearance in most modern constitutions, securing them the highest possible legal
protection. Furthermore, the vast majority of human rights scholarship to date has been
undertaken by legal academics: as Michael Freeman has noted, ‘human-rights talk is
ubiquitous, but human-rights study is still predominantly legalistic’.12
The ubiquity of law in the human rights movement is perhaps understandable.
Formal laws are both programmatic and enforceable: they can set normative standards
and prescribe boundaries and limits to States’ behaviour. Prescribed in formal legal terms,
human rights cannot be considered mere rewards distributed by benevolent governments.
Jack Donnelly has argued that those capacities accord law a unique importance in human
rights discourse:13
The law, largely independent of its substance, has a certain authority and normative force. Even
where (international and even national) legal norms diverge sharply from national political
practice, the critical leverage provided by legal authority can be of real significance, especially
in the long run.
Accordingly, those with an interest in human rights have tended to put considerable faith
in formal legal solutions to human suffering and inequality, emphasising law’s juridical,
performative power. Defining and understanding the human rights project in purely
positivist terms, however, has the effect of reducing human rights to a set of prescribed
rules, which has allowed some commentators to see the inevitably limited effectiveness of
state-declared laws as a tool to address injustice and challenge engrained power-structures
as proof of the overall failure of human rights.
It is easy to see how this has happened. All too often human rights laws have been
unable to live up to expectations that they will make a positive difference. Human rights
treaties are born out of compromises made by state representatives in politicised
environments, and it is States themselves that bear the burden of enforcing human rights
treaties.14 The ability of formal laws to protect individual rights, hampered as they often
are by weak enforcement mechanisms, falters, often to dramatic effect, when they collide
with the other political imperatives—a problem that has been particularly apparent in a
climate dominated by the threat of terrorism. From a liberal perspective, the obvious
remedy is reform, strengthening law’s power to operate as intended. However, a powerful
argument has emerged from the left which presents human rights themselves as having
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12 M Freeman, ‘Putting Law in its Place: An Interdisciplinary Evaluation of National Amnesty Laws’ in S
Meckled-García and B Çali (eds), The Legalization of Human Rights: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Human
Rights and Human Rights Law (Routledge, Abingdon 2006) 52–53.
13 J Donnelly, ‘The Virtues of Legalization’ in Meckled-García and Çali (n 12) 74.
14 R Kapur makes this point when she argues that ‘the gap between formal rights and the actual status of
disadvantaged groups has not decreased as a result of the legalization process’ (R Kapur, ‘Revisioning the Role
of Law in Women’s Human Rights Struggles’ in Meckled-García and Çali (n 12) 101).
served to institutionalise and legitimise the power of States: from this viewpoint, the very
act of describing formal legal limits to States’ power serves to validate the exercise of that
power. In The End of Human Rights, Costas Douzinas argues that declarations such as
the revolutionary constitutional documents of the late eighteenth century ‘proclaim the
universality of right but their immediate effect is to establish the boundless power of the
state and its law’.15 Douzinas’s critique seriously challenges the utility of human rights as
a tool with which to confront the misuse of power. The potential benefits of law are cast
aside in despair: the ‘end of human rights’ has been reached.
Douzinas’s comments are part of a wider critique of rights that has had a powerful
impact on recent debate, making this a bewildering time for those accustomed to
expressing their concern for inequality and human suffering through the language of
human rights. The basis of this sceptical position, however, is an excessive emphasis on
the formal legal aspect of the human rights project and, therefore, we would argue, those
who have declared its failure have done so on grounds that concede much to formal
positivism.16 It is indeed important to acknowledge the limited effectiveness of law as a
set of formal rules, but it must also be recognised that law operates both as a performative
force and as part of a wider discursive network in which notions such as justice and
human rights, which have meanings that extend beyond formal law, may be considered
and articulated. It is only as part of such a network that human rights law may be
appropriately connected to a wider understanding of human rights, not only as legal
expectations but as expressions of empathy with and compassion for the suffering of the
powerless.
The problem, then, is not to do with human rights as such but with an excessively
formal or positivist understanding of them, and so it is neither necessary nor helpful to
reject human rights and to declare their failure. The need is for those with an interest in
human rights to understand them more imaginatively and more empathetically. Patricia
Williams, viewing the situation from the point of view of those who are dispossessed,
argues that the problem with rights ‘is not that the discourse is itself constricting but that
it exists in a constricted referential universe’:17
‘Rights’ feels new in the mouths of most black people. It is still deliciously empowering to say.
It is the magic wand of visibility and invisibility, of inclusion and exclusion, of power and no
power. The concept of rights, both positive and negative, is the marker of our citizenship, our
relation to others.
Correspondingly, Martha Minow asserts that communities are strengthened by sharing
a commitment to restrain power, ‘so that even the powerless can appeal to those words’.18
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15 C Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2000) 101.
16 For a collection of essays on this issue see Meckled-García and Çali (n 12).
17 PJ Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Virago Press, London 1993) 159, 164.
18 M Minow, ‘Interpreting Rights: an Essay for Robert Cover’ (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 1860, 1910.
Human rights language, recognised as it is by those in positions of authority, can still act
a ‘brace against power’.19
If meaning is often given to human rights norms, as Minow argues, outside of formal
legal frameworks,20 then human rights scholars, including legal scholars, need to expand
the frames of reference within which they work to include the experiences of the
dispossessed. Their aim, as Upendra Baxi has suggested, might be to connect the concept
of human rights with an understanding of human suffering: ‘the statist human rights
discourse in its enunciations of human rights does not relate to languages of human pain
and social suffering’.21 Conor Gearty has argued a similar point, but has suggested that
compassion might be a more suitable foundation for human rights than suffering, in that
implicit in the latter is an emphasis ‘on action as well as a caring state of mind’.22 As Kapur
has argued, ‘human rights when conceived primarily as a formal legal project, is not a
realm of transformative political possibilities’,23 but it may well be that an alternative
conception of human rights allows them greater agency. The connection between human
rights and human suffering for which Baxi and others have called may be facilitated by
attending less to formal law and more to the social and cultural activity that gives law
meaning.
In this paper we start from the position that the creation of legal meaning is a process
shaped by cultural dialogues, and indeed that social and cultural activity is required to give
law meaning.24 Human rights, we propose, is best understood as a space where law
interacts with other kinds of cultural and social activity in order to advance the claims of
those whose humanity has not been fully acknowledged.25 Viewed in this light human
rights can be envisaged as a discursive space in which injustice and suffering are described
and claims to redress imbalances of power are made, not necessarily through reference to
formally announced laws. This vision of human rights allows that law’s authority and
language of judgement has a utility—the disempowered can find law’s assertive discourse
useful in framing and enforcing their rights claims—but does not overestimate the
capacity of formal laws to engender change. Human rights, in this model, can play a
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19 Ibid, 1897.
20 Ibid, 1861–2.
21 U Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, New Delhi 2002) 17.
22 C Gearty, Can Human Rights Survive? (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 46.
23 Kapur (n 14) 112.
24 See RM Cover, ‘Nomos and Narrative’ (1983–4) 97 Harvard Law Review 4; CA Reich, ‘Towards the
Humanistic Study of Law’ (1964–5) 74 Yale Law Journal 1402. See also J Boyd White, Heracles’ Bow: Essays
on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 1985) and When Words Lose
their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language, Character, and Community (University of
Chicago Press, Chicago 1984).
25 For an attempt to understand international law as a discourse of popular resistance see B Rajagopal,
International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and Third World Resistance (Cambridge
University Press, 2003).
central part in an ongoing process of social reordering, a process in which law engages
alongside other disciplines.
Central to the advantages of viewing human rights laws in this way is that it opens
them up to the free play of imagination. Unconstrained by narrow formal positivism, we
are free to imagine what human rights ‘ought to’ or ‘might’ look like. Marginalised people
may benefit from this activity, which can facilitate the ongoing disruption and re-
imagining of human rights and allow the narratives of those silenced by formal laws to
be incorporated into human rights discourse.26 Jeanne Gaakeer describes this approach
to law as one ‘that can provide openness against the dominance of any world view,
allowing for a polyphony of voices’.27 Such cultural activity may not only point to what
is wrong with officially declared laws, but can generate radical alternatives to them and
operate as a ‘potential restraint on arbitrary power and violence’.28 The process of
developing shared understandings of legal meaning through conversations is presented
by Gaakeer as a constructive one because ‘social intercourse forces us to recognize the
needs of others’.29 While this approach to law does not enable one to find the closure that
formal legal texts appear to promise, embracing the apparent instability of non-scientific
understandings of law allows us to move closer to a humane conception of human rights. 
For this opportunity to be acted upon, however, means recognising the extrinsic link
between law and the societies and cultures within which it operates. Law is a matter of
concern not merely among lawyers but within the public sphere, a deliberative space in
which ideas and arguments of common concern can be assessed by a critical public. In
Habermas’s conception ‘the products of culture’ are an important means by which such
debate is generated, and any consensus that is reached in the public sphere will have an
impact upon the political, and therefore the legal, realm.30 Theatrical performances of
human rights issues and legal practice place ideas and arguments before audiences,
prompting and informing debate in a way that exemplifies this process.
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26 See, for example: C Heilbrun and J Resnik, ‘Convergences: Law, Literature and Feminism’, (1989–90) 99 Yale
Law Journal 1913; Williams (n 17).
27 J Gaakeer, Hope Springs Eternal: An Introduction to the Work of James Boyd White (Amsterdam University
Press, Amsterdam 1998) 165.
28 Cover (n 24) 68.
29 Gaakeer (n 27) 34. See also Boyd White, 1984 (n 24) 273, who says the following:
To conceive of the law as a rhetorical and social system, a way in which we use an inherited language to talk to each
other and to maintain a community, suggests in a new way that the heart of the law is what we always knew it was:
the open hearing in which one point of view, one construction of language and reality, is tested against another.
The multiplicity of readings that the law permits is not its weakness but its strength, for it is this that makes room
for different voices and gives a purchase by which culture may be modified in response to the demands of
circumstance. It is a method at once for recognizing others, for acknowledging ignorance, and for achieving cultural
change.
30 J Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, trans Thomas Burger (Polity, Cambridge
1992) 29. For a discussion of the relationship between the literary public sphere and public sphere in the
political realm, see pp 51–56 of that text.
James Boyd White has written, ‘Law always operates through speakers located in
particular times and places speaking to actual audiences about real people’.31 The
emphasis on positive law in legal education, the inclination amongst lawyers to impose
order and deny the ultimate ambiguity of meaning, has led many lawyers to think in
formal terms rather than to explore the transformative potential of law in practical
situations. The theatre offers a way of imaginatively exploring the possibilities offered by
human rights discourse, making it potentially more successful than law at disrupting
dominant discourses in human rights. Moreover, the formality and practicality that tend
to characterise legal discourse can be balanced by the imaginative, emotional response to
the experience of others that is made possible by its articulation within a theatrical
context, allowing the required connection between human rights and human suffering
and leading to increased pressure for change. We turn now to consider these propositions
in the light of three recent theatrical productions that draw attention to human rights
issues.
III. GUANTÁNAMO, MY NAME IS RACHEL CORRIE, 
AND CALLED TO ACCOUNT
Since Ancient Greece, theatre has acted as a forum in which political and moral issues
can be debated and explored, lacking the immediate practical impact of law but
surpassing it in range and depth.32 Verbatim theatre, a mode of theatrical intervention
developed since the 1990s, is of particular interest here. Three examples of verbatim
theatre in performance will be described in this section, each representing an interesting
variation on the model; having outlined their differences of approach but essentially
similar intentions, we will consider how far they articulate and address aspects of human
rights which are beyond the scope of the law, and what status law is accorded within them.
In a separate and final section, we will explore the question of what practical efficacy such
drama might have in the arena of human rights. The first play that we will look at is
Guantánamo: ‘Honor Bound to Defend Freedom’ (Tricycle, 2004); the second is My Name
is Rachel Corrie (Royal Court, 2005); the last and most recent is Called to Account (Tricycle,
2007). We will preface our descriptions of each with a brief introduction to the notion of
verbatim theatre.
Verbatim theatre, as the name suggests, involves the re-creation on stage of the
recorded speech of real individuals. Some verbatim work focuses on the dramatic
possibilities inherent in the vagaries of oral discourse, drawing attention to the ticks 
and idiosyncrasies of individual speech as a means of defamiliarising human
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31 Boyd White, 1985 (n 24) 36.
32 See, for example, A MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, (2nd edn Duckworth, London 1985).
communication.33 More often, however, verbatim theatre has a political agenda, drawing
on the speech of individuals involved in particular situations in order to give a public
platform to their experience of matters of concern to society in general. This strand of
verbatim drama has evolved from the tribunal plays staged by London’s Tricycle Theatre
since 1994, which have drawn on official records made of public, usually legal, hearings
to recreate the event in edited form for a wider public.34 In recent years the Tricycle has
expanded its remit to create theatrical tribunals in instances where actual legal process has
seemed to the practitioners conspicuous by its absence, while other theatres have deployed
personal testimony recorded in a non-legal context to make interventions which seek to
have an impact on a political and a legal level.
Verbatim theatre is seen as an effective means of addressing political situations in
general and human rights issues in particular because it offers a specific kind of theatrical
experience. As Richard Norton-Taylor, one of the pioneers of the form, has stated, ‘there
is something extraordinary about real people saying real things about extraordinarily
important events’.35 Central to the effect of verbatim theatre is the fact that these real
people and real statements are presented in a dramatic context where fiction is the usual
mode, so that audiences are accustomed to respond on an imaginative rather than
practical level. A different kind of attention, therefore, may be paid to human rights issues
when they are articulated here than when they are raised in more familiar contexts such
as broadcast and print journalism. As Chris Megson has written:36
At their best [verbatim plays] enable their audiences to undertake a collective act of bearing
witness. They replay political events or spoken testimony in order to retrieve a sense of the
complexity of issues that have been too easily turned into digestible headlines.
The three plays that serve as our examples, then, are all intended to foster in their
audiences a new understanding, emotional as well as intellectual, of the situations they
dramatise and the experiences they articulate.
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33 The work of fringe company Non-Fiction Theatre, for instance, has centred around the conceit of actors
recreating the voices of members of the public, interviews with whom they are simultaneously listening to
on personal minidisc players. Their shows Sex 1: Death 2 (2001) and We Haven’t Told a Porky Pie Yet (2002),
directed by Mark Wing-Davey, met with some success in London and Edinburgh.
34 The chief instigators of the tribunal plays have been the Tricycle’s Artistic Director Nicholas Kent and the
writer and journalist Richard Norton-Taylor. Their first tribunal production was Half the Picture (1994),
which dramatised the Scott Arms to Iraq inquiry; this was followed by Nuremberg (1996); Srebrenica (1996);
The Colour of Justice (1999), which recreated the inquiry into the murder of black teenager Stephen
Lawrence; Justifying War (2003), based on the Hutton Inquiry into the death of weapons inspector David
Kelly; and Bloody Sunday (2005). Guantánamo (2004) and Called to Account (2007) represent variations on
the tribunal model.
35 Speaking at the Central School of Speech and Drama symposium Verbatim Practices in Contemporary
Theatre on 14 July 2006.
36 C Megson, ‘“This is all theatre”: Iraq Centre Stage’ (Fall 2005) 15 Contemporary Theatre Review 369, 371.
The first, Guantánamo: ‘Honor Bound to Defend Freedom’, takes as its subject the now
notorious internment camp, and the script draws primarily on interviews with ex-
detainees and their relatives, as well as on public statements made by officials including
the then US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld. The audience hear from a range of
legal perspectives, and indeed the play’s opening speech is taken from Lord Steyn’s 2003
FA Mann lecture in which he described the camp as ‘a legal black hole’.37 The picture built
up is of considerable injustice, and the play has been described as an ‘unashamedly …
partisan work’ offering a counter to mainstream pro-US reporting in that country.38
Appropriately, given this function, the play has reached an unusually wide audience in a
number of countries.39
Our second example, also drawing on verbatim testimony and focusing attention on
international injustice, is My Name is Rachel Corrie. Performed by a single actress who
speaks directly to the audience, the script is made up of the writings—taken from journals,
letters and emails—of a young woman from the US who travelled to Palestine, worked to
highlight the plight of the occupied people, and died standing between a bulldozer and
a Palestinian home in March 2003. Corrie’s story is emotive, but her eloquence on behalf
of the Palestinian people ensures that the play is also rich in intelligent political argument.
Following its 2005 Royal Court premiere, the performance history of My Name is Rachel
Corrie is both extensive and controversial. When a New York run of the production
scheduled for Spring 2006 was cancelled at short notice following concerns expressed by
members of the local Jewish community, the play instead enjoyed a further London run
in the West End and a sojourn at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival. In October 2006, the
production finally opened off-Broadway at the Minetta Lane Theater where it played until
December.40
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37 V Brittain and G Slovo, Guantánamo: ‘Honor Bound to Defend Freedom’ (Oberon Books, London 2004) 5.
38 This comment was made during a conference presentation by Dr Valerie Lucas, Guantanamo: Honor Bound
to Defend Freedom, PSi #12: Performing Rights, Queen Mary, University of London, 14–18 June 2006.
39 The first performance at the Tricycle took place on 20 May 2004, and the production subsequently ran at
the New Ambassador’s Theatre from 16 June to 4 September. A parallel production opened in New York at
45 Bleecker on 19 August of the same year, transferring to the Culture Project, Greenwich Village and closing
on 19 December. For two performances in October, the part of Lord Steyn was played by Archbishop
Desmond Tutu (see Simon Hattenstone, ‘My first night in Guantánamo’ The Guardian 6 October 2004).
Performances in San Francisco, Washington, Florence and Pakistan and a programme of public readings by
school and community groups as well as theatre companies in the US were attested to by Gillian Slovo
speaking at the Central School of Speech and Drama symposium Verbatim Practices in Contemporary
Theatre on 13 July 2006. A production in Chicago ran between 11 February and 26 March 2006 at Timeline
Theatre Company, on which see www.timelinetheatre.com/guantanamo/index.htm (accessed 17 July 2008).
40 The production enjoyed two sold-out runs at the Royal Court, first at the smaller Theatre Upstairs and then
in the main house. The play’s run at the Playhouse Theatre, between March and May of 2006, also sold out,
before the production moved north for 24 further performances at the Pleasance Grand, Edinburgh. At the
Minetta Lane Theatre, which seats 407, Rachel Corrie was initially programmed for 54 performances in
October and November 2006, and the run was then extended to 17 December 2006. For more on the initial
withdrawal of the New York production see K Viner, ‘Surely Americans will not put up with this censorship’
Our final example is the Tricycle’s Called to Account (2007), which sought to assess
whether a legal case could or should be mounted against Tony Blair for the crime of
aggression with respect to Britain’s part in the 2003 invasion of Iraq; here the focus was
not on those suffering but on the political process that led to that suffering. As with
Guantánamo, the authors of this play were obliged to gather testimony themselves in the
absence of a formally constituted legal hearing (in fact, it would not be possible to hold
such a hearing at present because the International Criminal Court does not as yet exercise
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression). Called to Account breaks new ground, however,
by explicitly structuring the presentation of that testimony in a quasi-legal form, with
actors playing real lawyers who had been appointed by the theatre to present cases for
the prosecution and the defence. The central issue that emerged from the play was
whether the advice on the legality of the assault provided by the Attorney General was
given in good faith or whether its favourable verdict had been dictated by a political
imperative. The performance concluded with a summing up from each side, leaving
members of the audience—placed throughout in the role of jurors—to reach an overall
conclusion. Public interest in the issues dramatised was indicated by the fact that the
initial four-week run was extended to seven, ‘owing to unprecedented public demand’.41
Although all are variations on the model of verbatim theatre, each of the three plays
provides an audience with a particular and distinct kind of theatrical experience.
Guantánamo juxtaposes testimony given in private interviews with dialogue taken from
speeches and press conferences to expose the private anguish caused by public policy. The
result is epic in scale, in that the audience are granted an apparently omniscient view of
a range of situations in a range of locations over a period of years. By contrast, Rachel
Corrie encourages sustained engagement with the words of a single individual and with
her journey through life. As mixed emotions about a precocious naïve give way to
admiration and compassion for a committed activist, the play acquires a cumulative and
powerful emotional charge. Called to Account is different again, a more forensic exercise
in which punctilious mirroring of legal process serves to emphasise and implicitly decry
the absence of actual legal proceedings. Here, though there are moments of levity and
appeals to the emotions, cool reason is the dominant mode of spectatorship. Underlying
these differences of approach, however, are similar if not identical intentions: to inform,
to inspire compassion and to raise consciousness.
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The first of these intentions is probably the most obvious: to disseminate facts and
thus to enable informed debate. In Called to Account, for example, the audience hears
testimony from several senior political and military figures concerning the background
to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Sections from the text of the Attorney General’s advice to
the Prime Minister (dated 7 March 2003) which was equivocal about the potential legality
of any use of force are displayed for the audience, who are thus able to analyse it in some
depth and address the apparent discrepancies between this statement and the far less
equivocal statement made by the Attorney General in the House of Lords ten days later.
Presenting evidence in an imaginary criminal trial encourages the audience to weigh its
strengths and weaknesses and to reach a conclusion (or verdict) on the issues before it;
by contrast, an actual judgment from the International Criminal Court addressing the
same issue could only be received as determinative of the legal question(s) at issue, closing
down rather than stimulating discussion. Similarly, imparting information about the lives
of the detainees and their families in Guantánamo equips audiences to consider the
morality of the men’s detention, allowing them to engage with, and perhaps even resolve
through judgement, the issues under discussion.
These plays are also designed to inspire compassion. Looked at broadly, all three plays
draw the attention of their audiences to human rights failures: Guantánamo presents a
case for the detainees it represents; Rachel Corrie points to the injustice of one woman’s
death, but also the wider injustice of an illegal occupation; and Called to Account questions
whether a devastating invasion was launched with moral or legal justification. Through
drama, the situation is made easier to grasp on an empathetic, human level. To see, for
instance, the detainees in Guantánamo in their tiny cells, on stage as the audience enter
the space and throughout the performance, reading, eating and praying, is to get a much
clearer sense of what it would be like to be indefinitely confined in this cramped and
sterile space. This understanding is broadened when we hear from the detainees’ families
about the wider suffering and anxieties that the detentions have generated. In Rachel
Corrie, when the narrator describes an explosion that breaks all the windows in the house
while she is ‘being served tea and playing with the two small babies’,42 the audience is
allowed a glimpse of the domestic reality of life in Palestine, a reality that is otherwise
difficult to imagine. By means such as these, the plays are clearly intended to arouse
compassion, a compassion which, as in Gearty’s model, contains the seeds of action.
A third aspiration informing these plays is to raise consciousness by challenging
mainstream accounts and giving voice to the point of view of the dispossessed. In Called
to Account official versions of events are interrogated and opened for challenge. For
example, Claire Short says of the Prime Minister under whom she served, ‘he doesn’t see
it as lies, but I’m afraid it is lies’,43 vividly conveying a sense of the slippery, subjective
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politics at work at every stage of the process that led to war. At the outset of the play, we
hear from an Iraqi Kurd relating the gross human rights abuses experienced by the Iraqi
people under Saddam Hussein’s regime. In Rachel Corrie and Guantánamo, the voices of
human rights victims take centre stage and the stories unfold around the narratives of
those who would, in more formal arenas, too often be silenced. Through this attempt to
connect human rights with the language of suffering, theatre is here deployed as a means
of laying bare the narratives of the powerful.
If these plays issue a challenge to a dominant discourse to which legal language and
practice is central, we might expect it to follow that they are both explicitly and implicitly
critical of law as a means of furthering the causes they espouse. After all, what is presented
in each of these plays is the failure of formal legal remedies to address gross human rights
violation and, where human rights laws are referred to, it is in the context of their neglect.
The effect must be to remind us that the privileged position that formal laws occupy
within the dominant discourse should not blind us to their limitations as a means of
securing human rights and redressing human rights violations, and to signal that legal
positivism is a poor means of protecting individuals against excessive state power.
However, although the plays certainly draw attention to some of the shortcomings of the
legal approach to the alleviation of suffering, they do not suggest that the law should be
despaired of altogether. The prevalence of legal language and the reliance upon legal
structure and principle that are evident throughout each indicate the usefulness of law
within human rights discourse on a practical, political level, while the ways in which the
legal interacts with the dramatic show that there can be a productive, collaborative
relationship between the two. 
On a straightforward level, Guantánamo, Rachel Corrie and Called to Account confirm
the authoritative position of law in human rights discourse, supporting their claims of
injustice by asserting a concomitant illegality and investing authority in representatives
of the law. This is particularly apparent in Guantánamo and Called to Account in which
lawyers are represented on stage, making an articulate case for the detainees in the former
and carefully—indeed, judiciously—sifting the evidence in the latter. In Guantánamo,
the customary respect which is shown to the law and its representatives is uncritically
reflected, and even encouraged, in order to strengthen the case being made; indeed, one
reviewer favourably compared the rhetorical effectiveness of Gareth Peirce as played by
Jan Chappell to that of Gareth Peirce herself, taking part in a post-show discussion.44 The
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final speech in the play is delivered by Lord Steyn, thus giving the last word to an eminent
lawyer, and lengthy extracts from the same speech were reproduced in the programme,
as were sections of the Geneva Conventions. In the pseudo-legal process enacted by Called
to Account it is members of the audience who are designated as arbiters, the lawyers’ role
being primarily to elicit information from witnesses. However, here too the event both
begins and concludes with speeches from lawyers, and the play’s overall format strongly
encourages audience members to make their decisions on the basis of legal principle and
to formulate and express them in legal terms.
Moreover, the plays repeatedly show non-lawyers appealing to legal practice and
principle in their pursuit of justice. In Guantánamo, detainee Jamal Al-Harith protests
that ‘the Americans said, “There’s no law here, it does not apply”’,45 while a father’s plea
on behalf of his son is couched in these terms: ‘I’m not asking mercy from anybody. I am
asking justice … Justice in process ... Human rights justice.’46 In Rachel Corrie, the titular
protagonist is shown using legal arguments, among others, to condemn Israeli military
action against the Palestinians:47
When someone says that any act of Palestinian violence justifies Israel’s actions not only do I
question that logic in light of international law and the right of people to legitimate armed
struggle in defence of their land and their families; not only do I question that logic in light of
the fourth Geneva Convention which prohibits collective punishment, prohibits the transfer
of an occupying country’s population into an occupied area, prohibits the expropriation of
water resources and the destruction of civilian infrastructure such as farms … I also question
that logic on the basis of common sense.
Not only do such references show that the victims and campaigners represented in these
plays believe law to be a useful tool in their quest for justice, but the fact that the claims
of the dispossessed are framed in legal terms gives them a particular resonance and
authority, recalling Patricia Williams’ point that the language of legal rights can be
empowering in itself. More broadly, the quasi-legal structure of Guantánamo and
especially Called to Account are manifestations of an implicit faith in law as the mechanism
through which practical redress must ultimately be effected. For lawyers, too used to
communicating in a rarefied language that serves to deflect, rather than attract, wider
scrutiny of legal language and practices, there is something inspiring in theatre’s capacity
to inform and engage people in discourse that touches on legal matters. It might even be
argued that it is the plays’ references and appeals to the law that make them specifically
political entities, as opposed to existential explorations of human suffering or folly
directed towards no practical purpose.
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These plays, then, are critical of law insofar as its enforcement cannot always be relied
upon where it conflicts with the interests of powerful States, but at a deeper level
supportive of the principle that it is through the observance of the rule of law that justice
may be attained. This is not simply to say, however, that they act as effective
advertisements for the law as understood as a self-sufficient and wholly effective means
of guaranteeing justice. Rather they demonstrate that law’s utility does not end in the
courtroom, and encourage us to view law not as a discrete entity functioning
autonomously but as a site of discourse generating ideas, language and principles which
are then available for wider utilisation. Moreover, by taking what has been said and done
in one context and placing it before the public in another, these plays can give amplified
expression to voices normally sidelined by or excluded from the dominant discourse,
engaging audiences on an empathetic level and inspiring their compassion. In this way,
they encourage us to re-envision the end of the formal legal process as the starting point
of a further process, one which goes beyond law but from which law is by no means
excluded, and one which can release the radically transformative potential of human
rights.
IV. THE EFFICACY OF THEATRE AS A MEANS 
OF ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS
The three plays examined here are responses to injustice, and no one could deny the
honourable intentions of their authors; there are, however, good reasons to doubt whether
performances of these plays can have had any kind of practical impact on the problems
being addressed. One response to the question of how effectual a piece of theatre can be
is that there is value in asserting a truth, or a position, even if that assertion leads to no
tangible change. Clive Barker, writing at a time when political theatre was very much on
the back foot following the fall of the Berlin Wall, wrote:48
If times become hard and repressive … there is value in bearing witness. Whatever is happening
in Britain and in the rest of Europe, people are starving and oppressed, and the dispossessed
are being abused. In this world the theatre still has a role. The minimal role in protest is to
stand up and be counted.
Here Barker asserts theatre’s value as a means of expression, something few would
question, but he also indicates that expressing a viewpoint is political theatre’s ‘minimal’
function, the least it can do. As Bertolt Brecht said of his own practice, ‘I wanted to take
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the principle that it was not just a matter of interpreting the world but of changing it, and
apply that to the theatre’.49
Brecht remains the practitioner who has most fully articulated the ambitious
intentions behind political or campaigning theatre. He believed that theatre should
inform, should ‘put living reality in the hands of living people in such a way that it can
be mastered’;50 he believed that it should agitate, should arouse ‘indignation at human
conditions’;51 and he believed that it should empower, encouraging active consideration
of the topics highlighted so that ‘the spectator, instead of being enabled to have an
experience, is forced as it were to cast his vote’.52 In this way, he wrote, ‘theatre, art and
literature … [can] form the “ideological superstructure” for a solid, practical
rearrangement of our age’s way of life’.53 Brecht’s avowedly Marxist theatre called for
fundamental social change whereas our three plays focus on particular issues; nonetheless
the purpose of Guantánamo, Rachel Corrie and Called to Account is to make strong and
effective societal interventions in the tradition of political theatre as defined by Brecht. We
now consider how far, and in what ways, this objective is likely to have been achieved.
The question of how theatre affects its audiences, and thus of to what degree its
authors can hope to effect wider change, has been widely considered. Baz Kershaw’s 1992
study The Politics of Performance seeks to assess how far thirty years of radical community
theatre were successful in their aim of changing society. In this context he considers in
some detail the efficacy of performance, first defining this term:54
… by efficacy I mean the potential that theatre may have to make the immediate effects of
performance influence, however minutely, the general historical evolution of wider social and
political realities.
However, as Kershaw goes on to acknowledge, ‘the longer-term effects—ideological or
otherwise—that a performance actually might have on its audience … are notoriously
difficult to determine’,55 a problem that emanates not from the nature of theatre itself
but from its relationship with ‘the wider social order, in all its discursive and institutional
complexity’.56 It is one thing to conceptualise a public sphere and to reason that cultural
products affect public opinion which must, in turn, affect political policy; it is another to
identify concrete examples. Kershaw’s solution to this apparently intractable problem is
to examine the potential, rather than the actual efficacy of the radical performances he
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describes. Guantánamo, Rachel Corrie and Called to Account are theatre of a much more
mainstream kind, though there is a formal innovation to consider in terms of their use
of verbatim material. Our approach here will be to compare the general efficacy of theatre
to that of other, more mainstream modes of communication, and then to consider more
particularly the likely efficacy of verbatim theatre as against that of other, more fully fictive
modes of performance.
One obvious consideration is the scale on which these plays can have had their effect.
It has to be acknowledged that, in comparison to other forms such as film, television or
even the novel, the theatre is a minority concern, speaking only, as Richard Schechner
has noted, to ‘the relatively few who pay attention’57. By the standards of theatre, and non-
musical theatre in particular, Guantánamo, Rachel Corrie and Called to Account have been
widely viewed but, by the standards of mass culture media, the numbers involved are tiny.
Moreover, many of those attending these plays are likely already to have been in agreement
with their central assertions, further lessening the likelihood that minds can have been
changed on a large scale. Hopes for the practical effectiveness of these plays, therefore,
would seem to rest not on their reaching a mass audience but on their having a powerful
effect on a relatively small number of people. Before we consider the kind of effect they
might have had, though, it is worth noting that the plays were produced at theatres with
a high degree of cultural prestige, attracting audiences largely from the educated,
professional classes, and thereby assisting a group of well-informed and critically engaged
citizens to contribute to debate in the public sphere. Seen from this angle, theatre’s often
criticised status as an elitist art form can be seen to have an upside.
Moreover, in formal terms, and notwithstanding their much wider reach, theatre has
been favourably compared to television news and print journalism as a means of
addressing human rights issues. The problem ascribed to conventional mass culture
representations is twofold, relating both to our ability to grasp the information presented
intellectually and to our capacity to engage with it on a human, emotional level. Faced
with the daily horror of the news, Gareth Peirce suggests in Guantánamo, ‘we read, we
watch, we hear about atrocities … but … we don’t have the capacity to take it in and react
to it in the way we should as human beings’.58 Similarly, writing in August 2004, Kate
Kellaway of the Observer contrasted the fragmented nature of much television news with
the sustained focus that may be achieved in the theatre, writing that ‘it is a remarkable
moment for political theatre … people want from [it] a clarity they are not getting from
politicians’.59 Finally, Rachel Corrie’s parents have suggested that60
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Theater can reach people in a different and deeper place than reading a news article or listening
to a speech: there is an emotional aspect that for some people can be more long-lasting and
motivating.
This emphasis on clarity and humanity reflects Brecht’s aim that theatre should ‘put living
reality in the hands of living people in such a way that it can be mastered’, making
information not only available but graspable in both intellectual and emotional terms.
This is a function which has arguably become more important at a time when we do not
suffer so much from a lack of information but rather from a disorientating surfeit: a
condition described by Jean Baudrillard as ‘a completely new species of uncertainty, which
results not from the lack of information but from information itself and even from an
excess of information’.61
If theatre can be seen to possess advantages over mass culture forms as a means of
representing pressing situations with clarity and humanity, the claim of verbatim theatre
is that it possesses greater authority than can conventional drama due to its exact and
demonstrable relation to objective reality. It is of course true that no representation can
ever be entirely accurate or wholly objective, but nonetheless the conscientious recreation
of recorded speech makes verbatim theatre less inaccurate and less subjective than a purely
fictive response to the same situation; the aim is that the situations dramatised are
regarded as real. How the audience may be expected to receive a verbatim performance,
however, is an interesting question, because it is central to the way in which audiences
habitually attend to theatre that they understand the events they witness on stage not to
be real.
Anthropologist Victor Turner makes connections between ritual and theatre, marking
out the former as creating for tribal societies a liminal space situated at the threshold
between one state and another and the latter (the product of more complex, industrial
societies) carrying forward some of the same properties to give audiences an experience
which is ‘liminoid’. Turner characterises leisure time as ‘a betwixt-and-between, a neither-
this-nor-that domain between two spells of work’ and entertainment such as theatre as
‘all play and choice’.62 As Kershaw writes, this means that the events of a play are accepted
as ‘both real and not real’; and, precisely because spectators are permitted to ‘treat the
performance as of no consequence’, it may act as ‘a kind of ideological experiment’, in the
course of which the spectator may in fact decide that ‘the performance is of central
importance to his or her ideology’.63 It is in such ideological adjustments, Kershaw
believes, undertaken collectively by members of a given audience or audiences, that
performance efficacy is ultimately to be located.
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It may be that this is at the root of the perceived advantages of theatre over other
forms of communication cited by Peirce, Kellaway and the Corries. Freed from the
obligation to consider what is witnessed as real and consequential, theatre audiences may
be readier to engage imaginatively with what they see, and thus to respond at a deeper
level, their habitual defences dropped. However, the particular aims and nature of
verbatim theatre complicate the model. In Guantánamo, Rachel Corrie and Called to
Account, as with all examples of the form, the balance between ‘both real and not real’ is
slightly different. Here the choice is not whether to accept a given piece of fiction as
relevant or otherwise, for it is not fiction that is being presented and the relevance of the
action is insisted upon by the producers and performers. Rather, the choices that an
audience member may face when presented with purportedly factual situations in a
context habitually associated with the fictive are whether to trust or not to trust, and
whether to be convinced or otherwise. However great the integrity of the practitioner,
these choices will remain, though of course the more accurate the play is perceived to be,
the more likely it is to be trusted and to convince.
A further distinction that might be of assistance here is Elaine Scarry’s between ‘the
made-up and the made-real’. Acknowledging a contemporary enthusiasm for highlighting
the constructed nature of phenomena more usually taken as given (among the examples
Scarry cites are quarks, wildernesses, childhood and the law), she argues that these remain
distinct from the overtly fictional, overtly constructed phenomenon of art. While they
share with art their constructed nature, in the case of a phenomenon of the former kind64
… the initial work of invention was compounded by an additional process through which
reality was conferred on it or discovered in it; and the essence of this second stage lay in the
making invisible of the traces of its having been created in the first place.
It is interesting to surmise what Scarry might make of verbatim theatre. She might well
argue that, for all the attempts at ‘making real’ that are represented by the practitioners’
strivings for authenticity, plays such as Guantánamo remain constructed events and
therefore, in her terms, ‘made-up’. This would be hard to refute. She might go on, however,
to point out that this constructedness may be less overt than that of a conventional drama
but is surely less covert than is that of a quark or the law; she might even suggest that, by
virtue of its status as self-evidently constructed, verbatim theatre invites engagement with
its subject matter in a context wherein reality is conceived of as shapeable and changeable
rather than fixed and immutable. According to this line of thinking, the constructed
nature of verbatim theatre implicitly draws attention to the constructed nature of, for
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instance, the rationale for detaining those held at Guantánamo, the perception that the
Palestinians are responsible for their own plight, and the Blair government’s case for war.
If this is so, then it is significant because, as Scarry asserts: ‘Seeing that a phenomenon is
constructed, our own access to the artifact increases, as does the chance to reshape it, if
it is in need of reshaping: if, for example, it endangers other people.’65 What evidence
there is indicates that Guantánamo, Rachel Corrie and Called to Account elicited emotional
responses from audiences. Lyn Gardner, reviewing My Name is Rachel Corrie for the
Guardian, urged her readers to see the production:66
Go, and take your teenagers with you … because just occasionally you see a show in the theatre
and hear a voice that, like Rachel’s, vibrates with a passion and idealism, and that teaches us all
how to live.
When Guantánamo opened in New York, the journalist Gary Younge captured some
reactions from members of the audience. ‘I felt confused as to whether I should appreciate
it as art or as real life, because it was really both,’ said one, indicating that the play had
obliged him to renegotiate his habitual responses to theatre. Another commented, ‘I knew
the stories cold … but I was still completely moved,’ while a third said, ‘I was expecting
to have an intellectual response. But it was very emotional. I cried.’ ‘This is the kind of play
that should be seen by 30 million Americans,’ was the conclusion of Richard Levy; ‘It
could really make a difference and change their understanding.’67 Even the comparatively
arid Called to Account provoked ‘gasps and then tears’.68
The basis of claims for the practical efficacy of theatre is that a performance has the
potential to alter the wider socio-political situation by affecting the thoughts and, perhaps
more importantly, the feelings of those who witness it, thereby influencing their future
action: as Kershaw writes, ‘the immediate effects of performance’ must ‘influence, however
minutely, the general historical evolution of wider social and political realities’.69 The
immediate effect of these plays was, the responses cited suggest, to arouse compassion, but
just as significant is the relationship with reality that the performances were seen to have.
Theatre, and verbatim theatre in particular, facilitates an imaginative and empathetic
reaction to real situations with which we may already be familiar but which we are
unlikely to have fully apprehended. Though the relationship between the real and the not
real in a verbatim performance is a complex one, the effect seems to be that the external
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reality to which the performance relates can be more fully recognised by audience
members as a result of that performance. Recognition need not necessarily lead to
behavioural change, but it seems unduly pessimistic to suggest that nothing audience
members learned or felt while watching Guantánamo, Rachel Corrie and Called to Account
led to alterations in their views and, thereby, to ‘the general historical evolution of wider
social and political realities’.
V. CONCLUSION
Human rights exist to provide a language through which to respond to injustice and
inhumanity; as Conor Gearty has argued, the term ‘human rights’ signifies an imaginative
understanding of suffering that insists on action. Some critics have despaired of human
rights on the basis that their expression through legal discourse is inadequate to articulate
the human suffering that they are intended to alleviate. We have argued, however, that the
equation of human rights with formal human rights laws existing in isolation is neither
realistic nor helpful, and that the simultaneous articulation of human rights within other
cultural forms can make more fully evident the connection between rights and suffering.
What makes plays such as Guantánamo, Rachel Corrie and Called to Account effective is
their capacity to arouse a compassionate response to the suffering dramatised that acts as
a spur to action. Precisely because theatre is a medium that invites an imaginative rather
than a practical response, the dramatic representation of human suffering allows for a
sustained empathetic engagement with the issues explored and creates, therefore, a greater
likelihood that audience members will contribute to debate within the public sphere and,
indeed, will act upon their experience of the drama. It is by making the connection
between human rights and human suffering that has been seen to be lacking that these
plays make their valuable contribution to the discourse of human rights.
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